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In 1903 the Zionist Movement would be forever changed when its leader,          Theodor Herzl would propose purchasing territory in Uganda, located realistically in Kenya, for the purpose of establishing a Jewish State until they were able to freely build one in their ancient homeland. While historians have in the past examined the conflict resulting within the movement from Herzl’s proposition later known as the Uganda project, little scholarship has been done in examining the social backgrounds of those in support and against this highly controversial strategy. 





Part 1: External Factors causing the Conflict
Prior to the founding of the modern Jewish State of Israel theorists, leaders, and religious figures of various backgrounds and political persuasions, had pondered what was to be done with the Jewish people. Anti-Semitism had long plagued the Jews since they had left their original home located today within and adjacent to the state of Israel. Thirteen nations had for example, officially outlawed Jewish people from their society between just the period of 1421 and 1494 (Rushkoff 101). Maintaining strict religious codes forbidding marriage outside their faith, Jews since their departure from the Land of Israel now primarily resided throughout Eastern and Western Europe in what is referred to as the Diaspora. While for centuries they had maintained their own solidarity as a people, by attributing their origins to Eretz-Israel, upholding the same religious values, and sharing similar dietary restrictions and cultural practices, they had also assimilated to their new homes by the 19th century. 
They had integrated themselves in these societies by participating in the political, economic, and social structures created by these host nations to varying degrees, while still retaining their religion intact and separate from their national identity (Shimoni 15). They would take part in revolutions and uprisings throughout Europe, suffering equally alongside their fellow countrymen as protestors and soldiers, in hopes that their alienation would subside. During this turbulent era, Jews would for example in France, join the masses in declaring themselves Frenchmen, and demand enfranchisement and liberty during the French Revolution (Kallen 437). Anti-Semitism however still oppressed the Jews even after their active involvement in these social movements, causing them to further question their identity and role in society.
By the late 19th century, the Jewish people would become ostracized by the concept of nationalism when nations identified a single religion and origin to describe their citizenship and roots within these nations. As states modernized industrially—increasing contact between the once isolated feudal societies—a common ethnic identity and heritage focusing on religious beliefs and origin was established by ruling governments. This belief in an often-mythical birthplace of a nation, eventually alienated the Jewish population scattered throughout the Diaspora (Rushkoff 180).
The social resources allocated to Western and Eastern European Jews, allowing them to blend into their host nations as well as access positions of power, varied dramatically between these two regions. As a result, these two people responded quite differently to anti-Semitism and how they should improve their status within the world. I will now explain how each population was affected differently by nationalism, and ultimately how this motivated them to join the World Zionist Organization founded by Theodor Herzl in 1897.
Western European’s Experience in the Diaspora
	Even though Jews in Western European states enjoyed full legal status as citizens by 1870, there was still great pressure on them to assimilate further by converting to Christianity, and identifying themselves foremost as citizens of the state before being Jewish (Shimoni 12). In hopes of attaining greater social mobility within Western Europe, the maskilim or Jewish intelligentsia instructed the Jewish people to modernize their faith with the following reforms explains author Gideon Shimoni:
These [reforms] included advocacy of occupational diversification 
for Jews;changes in Jewish life-styles, such as dress and manners; 
and most significantly, reforms in the Jewish liturgy and rituals—all 
aimed at compatibility with modernizing social norms of the state (12).
In response, the Jewish people scattered throughout Western Europe, by the late 19th century, had adopted the mother-tong of their new home countries, and primarily used Hebrew, the language of their faith and ancestors, in a religious context only (5).
According to Benedict Anderson, the formation of the nation relies on the population’s acceptance of a single language, and their ability to access it in printed media. Once colloquial languages were used in newspapers, pamphlets, and books, and were understood and read by the masses, nationalism revolutionized how the common man viewed himself in relation to society. He became conscious of his similar background, values, and position in society in relation to his fellow man through these mediums. The greater circulation of newspapers and the development of local languages, ultimately created an “imagined community” argues Anderson, uniting members of particular regions in how they expressed themselves, viewed politics, religion, and the world outside their homeland (40). 
Through the adoption of their nation’s language, Jews were making great efforts to intimately connect themselves with their countrymen’s national conscience. According to author Ziya Gokalp of Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization the adoption of a single language often leads however, to the identification of its people with one religion, and exclusion of its minorities’ belief systems. He cites the numerous civilizations who throughout history have after creating a language unifying its people, then declared one religion as embodying its value system in the following:
[The] Latins have been inclined to Roman Catholicism, the Germanic
peoples to Protestantism, and the Slavonic peoples to Eastern Orthodoxy
[...]The Mongols adopted Buddhism, the Manchurians Confucianism, 
and the Finno-Ugrians Christianity (80).

As a result, the collective solidarity of the Jewish community, which had previously expanded over national borders, disintegrated steadily as Jews were granted more political freedoms and grew more attached to their national identities. Shimoni explains how Jews were expected to forego their foreign value systems and writes:
	Within two or three generations at the most, a new type emerged—the
French or German or Italian Jew, each possessed of a different composite
of identity, and each divided from the other as never before by state 
boundaries, geographical, linguistic, and to some extent also nationalist-
ideology (12).
	
Modernization of the Jewish Diaspora therefore created a divide between the Jewish people, as well as maintained their marginalization, as the state became increasingly associated with a particular religious ideology and history. The ideas of the Enlightenment therefore benefited the Western Jew by allowing them freedom of religion and access to property, but with the rise of nationalism and industrialization, still forced them to choose between their loyalty to the state or to their religion.
	Torn between how to become socially mobile within a society upholding alien values to their own, the Jews’ survival and ability to live as equals among their often Christian counterparts, steadily became dependent upon their willingness to embrace nationalism. Should they assimilate completely by abandoning their religion, or continue to exist in defiance of the religious social norms of their nation? And if they did decide to
convert, would this rejection of their ancestor’s culture automatically eradicate the social stigmatization they experienced?
	Motivated by these questions, a Jewish journalist from Vienna, and later acknowledged founder of the Zionist Movement, Theodor Herzl, would in response publish, Judenstaat or The Jewish State in 1896. Inspired by anti-Semitic rhetoric he read in German Karl Durhing’s book, The Jewish Question as a Question of the Racial Damage for the Existence, Morals, and Culture of the Nations, Herzl became convinced in the 1880s along with many Jews that their people would never become full citizens of the European nations they inhabited (Herzl, Complete 4). He writes the following statement, which characterizes his own feelings of alienation as a Jew living in the country of Austria: 
The Jewish question exists wherever Jews live in perceptible 
numbers [...]where it does not exist, it is carried by Jews in the course
of their migrations. We naturally move to those places where we are
not persecuted, and there our presence produces persecution” (1896).
 
Herzl’s family had emigrated from Hungary to Austria, believing that they would have better life chances in this more westernized country. As a writer in Vienna for the New Free Press, Herzl discovered however from his life experiences and travels throughout Western Europe, that social equality was still not a reality for the Jewish people. After experiencing anti-Semitism in the commonly thought progressive societies of France and Austria, Herzl became convinced that his people must take action to secure their own independent nation, or their social standing in the Diaspora would only continue to worsen.
While he had always felt socially alienated from the greater society of Austria since he was a young child, Herzl recounts vividly in his diaries, his first experiences of anti-Semitism which drove him to question his status within the Diaspora. In a diary entry of 1895, Herzl recalls how seven years prior in 1888, he was humiliated in Maize as he was leaving a pub. He remembers a man calling after him “Hep, hep!” which in turn caused an entire crowd of people on the street to jeer and laugh at Herzl’s Jewish appearance. The second time Herzl encountered anti-Semitism was on his home “soil” causing him more anguish, he recounts in his diaries, “Someone shouted ‘Dirty Jew’ at me as I was riding by in a carriage[...]This shout went deeper” (16). Over time, Herzl believed that his individual experiences were collectively shared by many, causing him to ponder the Jewish Question more seriously than ever before. He writes the following in May of 1895 when he still remains only a journalist with a purpose yet to be determined:
For some time past I have been occupied with a work of infinite grandeur.
At the moment, I do not know whether I shall carry it through. It looks
like a mighty dream. But for days and weeks it has possessed me beyond
the limits of consciousness; it accompanies me wherever I go, hovers 
behind my ordinary talk, looks over my shoulder at my comically 
trivial journalistic work[.] (2).

At first, Herzl fantasizes in his diaries about the prospects of assimilation, believing that if the Pope were to help the Jewish people, Herzl could help conduct a mass conversion of the younger generations of Jews to the Catholic faith. He realized however, that even converted Jews were still struggling with the stigmatization placed on their ethnic origins. Walter Lacquer, author of A History of Zionism, explains how converted Jews not only became ostracized from their Jewish brethren, but were still
unaccepted by the Christian population. Lacquer writes, “Many Christians still abhorred converted Jews who were trying to show their assimilation by eating non-kosher foods and reciting Christian plays” (20).
In result, Herzl concluded that the Jews could never be embraced by Christian society, due to the proliferation of negative stereotypes associated with his people. While Jews for example, had made progress economically in Western Europe by entering fields of medicine and law, they still worked predominantly in occupational fields involving the exchange of capital. Because of their long-standing presence in this field, Jews had been stereotyped as greedy. Herzl explains that while their over-representation in these occupations was actually a product of their victimization throughout history preventing them from entering other fields, the Christian majority was virtually ignorant of the Jewish population’s past experiences of oppression. Even when Jews had managed to access high profile jobs within the government for example, these stereotypes were still powerful in preventing them from being viewed as equal citizens.
The Dreyfus Affair occurring in late 1894, illustrated this clear social division between the Jews and the Christian majority within Western Europe, when a French Jewish army captain was publicly stripped of his position after being accused of treason. Although Alfred Dreyfus was eventually found innocent five years later, the events following his trial and those especially occurring in early January of 1895 were remarked upon by all noteworthy Western Zionists, as it highlighted the deep seeded anti-Semitism still prevalent in Western society. Herzl reported in an article for the New Free press how onlookers yelled “Judas, Traitor!” at Dreyfus and later that night gathered in the streets in large masses screaming “Death to the Judas” (Pawel 207).
While many historians accredit Herzl’s interest in creating a Jewish state to this event, diary entries of Herzl’s show that he had been obsessed with the Jewish Question long before the Dreyfus Affair. These events did however convince many less radical Jews—skeptical of Herzl’s argument that assimilation could never be realized—that anti-Semitism was still very much apart of these societies, even if it was not officially condoned by their nation’s laws. Author Ernst Pawel explains the significance of the affair writing, “[It] revealed [...]the persistence of medieval fanaticism, blind prejudice, and murderous hate underneath the veneer of civility and civilization (210). The affair became a symbol therefore to Herzl and other Zionists, that even the most assimilated Jew would never become apart of the power elite if they remained a minority in these countries.


Eastern European’s Experience in the Diaspora
Within Eastern Europe and particularly Czarist Russia, where five million Jews resided in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, their existence was quite desperate in comparison to Western European Jews. Due to their religious beliefs, Jews in this region were for the most part, viewed as outsiders, not worthy to receive the same political freedoms, work in the same occupational fields, or live within the same villages as the general public, ostracized to the Pale or ghettos typically miles outside any large metropolitan center. While they exercised greater occupational and social freedom than decades prior, their existence was quite bleak in comparison to Western Jews. Only four decades earlier for example, had the killing of Jews been socially acceptable according to Lacquer. He states, “ The murder of Jews was neither a sin nor a crime, but at most a disturbance of public order” (20). More disheartening was the policy that prevented Jews from not only moving freely within the country, but being able to live near the borders and even leave Russia.
These restraints placed on their mobility within the country, prevented them from not only finding well paying jobs, which were often located within the larger cities such as Moscow, but being able to feed and clothe their families. Only 200,000 well-to-do merchants, university graduates, and veterans were allowed to live outside Jewish settlements or the Pale (56). High rates of unemployment, disease, and poverty plagued East European Jews during this period. Lacquer explains their desperate living conditions, “Many families were crammed into one small house, infant mortality was high and labor productivity low. If the bread winner fell ill, this usually spelt doom for the whole family” (57).
Yet the state of the Jewish people would decline further in Eastern Europe, following the death of Alexander II in April of 1881. Anti-Semites blamed Jews for the death of the Czar, resulting in a long period of violence and political instability for the Jewish minority in this region. Angry mobs raided Jewish homes, stealing their possessions, and in many cases killing its owners. These instances would continue for many years, up until as late as 1905, and were known as the Pogroms, meaning, “to destroy” in Russian.
In result of their great physical and social isolation from the greater majority of Eastern Europe, the Jewish people of the Pale were more culturally autonomous and less disconnected from one another than their Western counterparts. While they were not politically recognized as a separate nation, Jews tended to view themselves as a unique
community or people who should remain independent from the greater state. They felt empowered by their minority status, and consciously chose to remain culturally unique from the majority of their nation.
Unlike the Jewish assimilators of the West, Eastern European Jews for the most part identified their official language as Yiddish and Hebrew rather than Russian. In 1897, an estimated 98 percent of the Jewish population acknowledged Yiddish as their first language (Shimoni 22). Journals were printed by the thousands in Yiddish as well as Hebrew, further developing the vernacular of these languages, and creating an “imagined community” amongst the Jewish population in the Pale. Historians refer to this period as the Haskalah or Enlightenment, when the Eastern Jews modernized not through political means, but socially and intellectually embraced their cultural traditions, revitalizing them in the 20th century (Kallen 446). Author H.M. Kallen explains the importance of this movement to the Pale, writing the following:
    [Jews] found themselves [...] loose, uprooted, tramps in mind and
    body, with more energy than efficiency. This energy they threw into 
the vernacular and Hebrew press, which they used as the device to 
get the benefits of their experiences to the Jewish masses hoping, and
succeeding, so to recover a basis of existence” (447).

The Jewish masses were spread over fifteen provinces of Russia alone, and were
an estimated 11 percent of the total population, but became intimately connected during this cultural renaissance (Shimoni 22). Jews in these regions also operated their own educational institutions, and had an estimated 370,000 Jewish students enrolled, in comparison to just 60,000 in secular Russian schools in 1904 (22). 
Their attachment to their faith and culture was therefore much stronger than those Jews attempting to assimilate in Western Europe. They sought power through their ability to remain an independent minority, directly conflicting with the Western belief that religious and economic reform could bring about greater social justice for the Jews. Michael Stanislawski explains: 
The notion that religious, educational, and cultural reforms still stand 
at the heart of the confrontation between Jews and modernity was 
rejected by the largest part of the Jewish intelligentsia in Eastern Europe
along with the belief that Western style embourgeoisment in both 
economic and metamorphic senses of the term, would solve the Jewish
problem in Eastern Europe (57).

As the pogroms became more and more violent, the political instability of the Jews worsened—climaxing in 1903 with the Kishinev Pogrom—thousands of Eastern European Jews were driven out of the Pale, choosing to immigrate into Western nations including the United States. Unlike previous pogroms where local authorities had casually allowed or instigated violence against the Jewish people, records now indicate that Russian officials of the highest levels, including the Minister of the Interior, Vyacheslav K. Plehve and the Czar Nicholas II, were intimately involved in inspiring these riots (Pawel 490). 
P. Krushevan’s pamphlet The Rabbis Speech, with the aid of the Russian government, was distributed by the thousands just weeks prior to Kishinev and believed to be the cause of these horrific events. The anti-Semitic pamphlet argued there was a world-wide Jewish conspiracy to rule the world (490). In result, a total of 49 people were killed, 495 injured, a large unknown number of women raped, 1,500 small shops plundered and destroyed, and an estimated 20 percent of the population forced into living on the streets following this devastating pogrom.
Consequently, the cities of Western Europe were flooded with those fearful and surviving immigrants, whose perception of themselves and culture in relation to the nation, was quite different from the assimilated Jews of the West. Stereotypes many Jews had been attempting to avoid, now once again gained validity as their eastern counterparts entered into these nations in great numbers. These Jews of Western Europe were once again forced to choose between the state and their religion, as they either resisted their association with these immigrants, or embraced them upon realizing that they too were still viewed just as foreign as those escaping the pogroms. David Vital explains this moral conflict existing within the Westernized Jew in the following:
The appearance of great numbers of impoverished, oddly dressed, 
uncouth, and above all, foreign Jews, Jews moreover, who were 
generally uninhibited in their sense of Jewish identity (because they 
neither had, nor thought they had any other) was a profoundly 
unsettling phenomenon for the great majority of the indigenous 
Jews of Western Europe (Origins 209).

	Ultimately, a shared experience of oppression bound these people together in the end, in viewing a self-ruling state as their way of escaping their marginalized status. 
Leo Pinsker, a prominent Jew during this era, explains how Jews of both backgrounds, believed that although their experiences of oppression differed greatly, their social standing in the Diaspora was similar, in that they both were relegated to the lower classes of society, unwanted and despised by their host nations. He states the following:
For the living, the Jew is a dead man; for the natives an alien and a 
vagrant; for property holders a beggar, for the poor an exploiter
and a millionaire, for the patriot a man without a country; for all
 	classes a hated rival (qtd. in Shimoni 72).

The idea of having a territory unto themselves, spoke to all Jews who felt subjugated in these societies and desired to be the popular majority of their nation, and to once again freely dictate social norms. For centuries, Jews of the Diaspora wishing to escape anti-Semitism and oppression longed to return to the Land of Israel. Herzl’s pamphlet, The Jewish State was not presenting a new concept by any means, but was published at a critical moment in time when all of these political and social factors had equally motivated both Western and Eastern European Jews to take a different course of action in seeking a solution to the Jewish Question.
Within his book, he outlined the potential plan for obtaining funds to buy a large territory, attract settlers, compose a government, a constitution, and provide a new found protection to the Jewish people and their culture. Eventually Herzl’s plan would receive acclaim throughout Europe from Jewish scholars, activists, writers, and religious figures within the community, as well as those of foreign governments wishing to also find a solution for the ever growing Jewish population flooding their borders.
	On August 29 of 1897, Herzl backed by Jews from all of Europe, would coordinate the First Congress of the World Zionist Organization in Basel, Switzerland and remain the presiding President of the following five congresses until his death on July 3,1904 (Vital 356). Herzl would adopt the term Zionism, coined by  Nathan Birnbaum in 1893, because the movement’s intentions were to be recognized not as a philanthropic organization like those of the past, but as a political party wishing to be recognized specifically by the governments of the world (Shimoni 88). Their mission statement: “The aim of Zionism is to create in Palestine for the Jewish people a publicly recognized homeland under legal guarantees, “(qtd. in Kallen 451). In these highly formal conventions, delegates would debate how the Jewish State was to be purchased and structured. They formed separate cabinets to research ways of convincing the Sultan Abdul Hamid II of the Ottoman empire to grant the Jews a charter allowing them to immigrate to these lands, motivate Jews to fund their organization and the future state, and help promote their own organization’s goals and accomplishments to the Jews and gentiles of Europe and the United States (Oxford). 
While the First Congress admitted all those Jews with a shekel—the equivalent of twenty-five U.S. cents— and who wished to attend, the movement became more structured in its later years. Each nation from then on was represented generally by at least two representatives, the number being adjusted according to the Jewish demographics of each country. Russian delegates for example during the First Zionist Congress comprised over one third of the delegates in Basel (Priini). The organization also created a ruling body known as the Actions Committee (A.C.) in which 23 members of prestige took on leadership positions, and five of which were voted in to be part of the Inner Actions Committee and directly assist Herzl as the Executive of the Actions Committee (E.A.C.).
Over the years however, Eastern and Western conceptions of the future Zionist state, began to rift I argue due to their different experiences in the Diaspora and view of nationalism. . By the Fifth Congress separate parties developed within the Zionist Organization still proclaiming allegiance to the greater congress, but believing that the ultimate Jewish state should embody different principles than those expressed by the majority of the movement.
Theodor Herzl for example, was the spokesperson for the moderate Jews of Western Europe and America comprising the political Zionists, who desired above all else to attain political security for their people. While Herzl lived in a Jewish district in Vienna, he was not deeply religious, influencing him to envision the Jewish state as one providing security and a haven for his people, but not a society in which religion determined government policy. He writes in his diaries that the rabbis will maintain rule only in the synagogue, just as the military maintains control solely over its soldiers and writes:
We shall let every man find salvation ‘over there’ in his own particular 
way[...] No more force will be exercised on any one than is necessary 
for the preservation of the state and order, and the requisite force will
not be arbitrarily defined by one or more shifting authorities; it will 
be fixed by iron laws (Herzl 1896).

While Jews would become the majority of the nation, Herzl did not envision the Jewish State becoming a theocracy where religious involvement was required by its citizens or where these centers of faith executed any kind of power over the laws governing the people. The Jewish State according to Herzl’s Altneuland—a fictional novel published in 1903 depicting the ideal Jewish State set in Palestine—would be modeled after the secular nations of Europe, advancing in technology and modernity rather than reaffirming the religious values of its people.
In contrast, Eastern European fundamentalists or cultural Zionists wished to re-institute Jewish culture into their people who had been forced to live in fear because of their alien faith. For many years, they too had debated within the Pale their future actions towards securing a territory within the Land of Israel. Leading this movement beginning in the early 1860s, known as the Hovevei Zion or “The Lovers of Zion” at its height was Leo Pinsker, who openly resisted the more radical Russian orthodox view that their people should not return in great numbers to the Land of Israel until the Messiah had ordered it so (Shimoni 42). With Pinsker’s death in the 1880s, and their inability to build sustainable yishuvs or agricultural settlements in Palestine, where some of its followers had illegally immigrated to, the Russian “Lovers of Zion” movement would lose strength at the end of the century (Kornberg 238). This would in turn cause many of its members to join the mostly Western led Zionist Organization years later. Various rabbis and religious spokesman would become prominent members of the Zionist Organization, vocalizing the interests however of those more observant Jews within the Eastern population. These Eastern Jews however still viewed themselves as a separate body within the organization, and envisioned the future Jewish State quite differently than their Western counterparts. 
Arguably the most prominent Eastern Zionist was Asher Ginsberg –pen name Ahad Ha’am meaning “One of the People”—who was the only speaker of the First Zionist Congress to openly criticize Theodor Herzl’s plans to purchase Eretz Israel from the Sultan— believing it impractical on multiple levels. Western Zionists’ claim that a nation could solve both their moral dilemma and the material problem existing within Eastern Europe was impossible in Ha’am’s opinion due to the size alone of Eretz Israel, which could not support the immigration of the estimated 11 million Jews of Europe. Like many Eastern Zionists, he believed the movement’s emphasis on the moral distress of living in the Diaspora was also quite insulting to those of Eastern Europe. Eastern Jews experienced oppression not just at the hands of their fellow citizens, but faced material distress such as poverty, hunger, unemployment, and above all discrimination from the very institutions they pledged allegiance to as citizens. As noted earlier, the local authorities and government during this era for example, often chose to turn a blind eye to criminal activity occurring during the destructive pogroms, instead of protecting the Jewish population. 
Ahad Ha’am expressed the view commonly supported by Russian Jews of Hovevei Zion that if they were to form a Jewish State, rather than seeking help from the imperialist powers of the world as refugees, they should gradually repopulate the lands of Israel on their own terms. The foundation of their state should therefore not be their ability to negotiate and politicize their future, but to reattach their people to their religion, culture, history, and land of the past, creating an invigorated identity for the Jewish people beaten down by their experiences in the Diaspora. 
Born in the province of Kiev in Russia to a Hasidic family, Ha’am, grew up intimately connected to the Jewish faith and people who had maintained their traditions throughout the centuries. Ha’am for example attended a traditional Hasidic school as an adolescent, and was eventually married off by his parents to a girl of their choosing. He would however in later years reject this structured lifestyle and immigrate alone to Germany where he received a doctorate in Ethics and Sociology. He eventually gained respect within the Jewish community when he became the editor of the Hebrew Monthly in Berlin and wrote in 1897 the pamphlet, Jewish State and Jewish Problem in which he addresses the different beliefs Western and Eastern Jews had regarding how to motivate immigration to Eretz Israel, as well as what the focus of the movement should entail. He writes the following:
          ‘To gather our scattered ones from the four corners of the earth’ 
          (in the words of the Prayer Book) is impossible. Only religion, with 
          its belief in a miraculous redemption can promise the 
          consummation (Ha’am 3).

Only the Jewish faith could inspire resettlement of the Land of Israel by the Jews, in Ha’am’s opinion, and therefore should be enriched and protected by the state, making it not just a political haven, but their faith’s cultural center in the world. Politics and economic stability alone could not be the goal of the Zionist movement, but the cultural and religious restoration of their faith and customs must lie at the center of their future state according to Ha’am and the cultural Zionists. 
This sect of the movement was particularly concerned over Herzl’s motives after reading his novel Altneuland, in which the state was set in Israel, but the characters spoke German rather than Hebrew. Russian Zionists were especially offended by this literary detail since they had over the past two decades taken great effort in developing the Hebrew language, which they envisioned as the only true language of the Jewish State. Just as Hebrew was the language of their most ancient text the Hebrew Bible, they believed this language should be rejuvenated along with their connection to their history and land. Russian Zionist Yehiel Tschlenow would in a letter to an anonymous source express Eastern Zionists thoughts about Herzl’s utopian piece when he wrote the following:
   	[R]espected persons [in Altneuland] take steps that in our opinion 
   	do not increase their honor[...]For us all Dr. Herzl is not only a 
writer, but a political leader of our movement. As such, he must 
remain in this affair even if he would like to act differently as a 
writer (Tschlenow Minutes 17).

Ha’am would later publicly denounce the literary piece of Herzl’s, claiming it, “was not really an expression of anything inherently Jewish,” calling it, “nothing more than a universalized European clone state, an expression of self-abnegation and collective assimilation to gentile culture” (qtd. in Shimoni 112). These words would in result provoke Nordau to strike out in defense of Herzl, against Eastern Zionists for not understanding the moral struggle facing Western Jews, which he felt was much more daunting than the material questions of the East. In defense of his Western brethren, he writes the following description of their distress:
   	He has lost the home of the ghetto, the land of his birth denies itself 
   	to him as a homeland...that is the moral Jewish distress which is more
bitter than the material one, for it is the affliction of the more highly differentiated, prouder, more 	sensitive beings .

	The conflict between these two sects would climax at the Sixth Zionist Congress of 1903 held in Basel, Switzerland. On the morning of August 21, 1903 Herzl proposed sending a committee to investigate the suitability of  Uganda for the purpose of establishing a temporary Jewish State.
Although Herzl ultimately desired the Jewish State to exist within Eretz Israel, due to external conditions, namely its subjugation to the Ottoman empire in the late 19th and early 20th century, he believed it was highly implausible they would be able to populate this territory in the near future. Prior to his decision to present the Uganda project to the Zionist Congress, Herzl believed he had truly exhausted all other avenues for obtaining a charter from the Sultan to allow further immigration of Jews to the Land of Israel, and saw this as a viable solution.
Beginning in 1896, Herzl first sought support from the German Empire who unlike the other great European powers, lacked colonies within Asia and Africa (Polkehn 77). Herzl attempted to appeal to their imperialist nature, as he believed it was a vital method for securing territory in Eretz Israel, promising the Jewish State to, “[Form] there part of a wall of defense for Europe in Asia, an outpost of civilization against barbarism” (Herzl Jewish 30). Due to Herzl’s familiarity with German, Herzl was easily able to communicate his vision of the state, and was supported from the beginning by a large body of German Zionists who also embraced the idea of their motherland having a colony within the Middle East (Polkehn 77). 
The German Empire had also developed a relationship with the Sultan by securing financial contracts to fund and later build, a railroad through Turkey in 1890 and then Baghdad in 1899; another key factor motivating Herzl to seek help from them (77). In hopes of therefore capitalizing on their blossoming relationship, Herzl made numerous attempts to explain the Zionist Organization’s cause to Kaiser Wilhelm II, and other influential German leaders during this time. By 1898, however Herzl realized the German Empire would be of little help in convincing the Sultan, due to their fear of upsetting its Turkish allies and the Christian population within its own nation (80).
Believing that he could possibly secure the charter without mediators, Herzl then approached the Sultan himself. He assured the Sultan that if he granted them the charter, they would assist the Turkish-ruled empire in resolving its ever-growing debts to foreign nations. The Sultan however, did not believe it in his empire’s best interest to allow the mass immigration of the Jews into its borders. At that time, Jerusalem was under the rule of the Sanjaks, and the Land of Israel was divided into many separate communities all ruled by different Ottoman lords. They had yet to unite as one nation and identify themselves as Palestinians, but had gradually become more resistant to Jewish settlements funded by Hovevei Zion. They had also over time been influenced by the notions of nationalism, and desired a central government that could be internationally recognized as maintaining political rule and autonomy over their land. Due to these reasons, the Sultan possibly regarded Herzl’s proposition as politically dangerous, and refused to grant a charter to the German, not wishing to upset his people any further. 
At the Fourth Zionist Congress, in 1900 undiscouraged, Herzl expressed to the delegates their new method for obtaining Eretz Israel, which would be through their alliance with the powerful British Empire (80). This was not so foreign of a notion when one takes into account the political strength and motives of this imperialist nation at the time, holding territories throughout Africa and Asia. The British had also historically sympathized with the landless Jews and for many decades, dating as far back as to the 1850s, had argued as a result of their generally Protestant ethics, that the Jewish people had a right to this territory (Kallen 434). Laurence Oliphant for example, believed like many Christians of his time, that the return of their messiah would not occur until the Jews lived once again in the Holy Land (440).  
Aside from cultural beliefs however, in the early 20th century the British government strategically saw it in their own best interest to have a colonial base within the Middle East besides Egypt, which had become less profitable and more difficult to control each year. In 1902, Herzl originally approached Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary of State, with the hopes of securing his support for Eretz Israel or at least El-Arish. Chamberlain agreed to help Herzl, it is believed mostly for political reasons. 
For one, the British government at that time was in the process of passing a highly controversial bill restricting the number of Eastern European Jews allowed to immigrate into England. Herzl had even been asked to testify before the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration in 1902 on the state of the Jews in Eastern Europe (Heymann 5). Helping the Jews find a homeland, and specifically aiding Herzl, who was the acknowledged leader of the movement, therefore helped them avoid the political repercussions of this act, as well as potentially place a “harmless” ally within this volatile continent (Vital Formative 157).
Although the Ottoman Empire was steadily crumbling due to debt, by 1902 France helped ease their financial instability by offering a loan to the Sultan. This loan would ultimately convince Chamberlain and Herzl that their opportunity was gone and that the Sultan would no longer need the financial aid of the Zionists (Kornberg 242). 
El-Arish located on the Sinai Peninsula, across from Egypt, seemed like a possible alternative. Similar to Eretz Israel, it held religious and historical significance to the Jewish people. It is on Mt. Sinai for example, where Moses is believed to have received the Ten Commandments after leading the Jews out of slavery in Egypt. Chamberlain however by 1903 advised Herzl to examine other territories due to the Egyptian government’s belief it would be an “imposition” to share the water of the Nile River with the prospective nation. 
In its stead, Chamberlain advised Herzl to consider occupying the territory of Uganda (Kenya), a British Protectorate where a million people could reside, until they were able to purchase the Land of Israel (Herzl 1498). Herzl recounts in a diary entry on April 24, 1903 the conversation in which Chamberlain introduced the Uganda project, in their meeting one-day prior and writes:
‘I have seen a land for you on my travels’, said the great Chamberlain, 
 	‘and that’s Uganda. It’s hot on the coast, but farther inland the climate
becomes excellent, even for Europeans. You can raise sugar and 
cotton there. And I thought to myself, that would be a land for 
Dr. Herzl. But of course he wants to only go to Palestine or its vicinity’ 
(1473).

While Herzl would attempt in this meeting to still argue for El- Arish becoming the location of their state, eventually Herzl would be convinced by Chamberlain that this was the next best course of action. 
Time and the lack thereof, also became a factor in motivating Herzl to consider more seriously the Uganda Proposal. The Kishinev Pogrom occurring between April 19-20, 1903 convinced Herzl that there must be actions taken immediately to secure a refuge for the Jewish people, even if it was only a temporary solution. With little time left before the Sixth Congress, Herzl also felt disillusioned by his inability to negotiate with the Sultan, yet still wanted to show he had made some progress to the Zionist Congress. Herzl believed they would at least be encouraged by this proposal because it marked the first time in the movement’s history they had received a charter or recognition as a political movement, even if it was not within Eretz Israel. Herzl however still dreaded having to relate these circumstances to the Congress and writes the following in his diaries on June 4, 1903:
    	In a few weeks our Zionist congress will convene, and if I haven’t
   	obtained anything by then, I shall be obliged to announce that all 
  	 hope of concluding an arrangement with the Sultan [...] is gone. 
And we shall be obliged to find some other territory (1501).

Herzl “with a heavy heart” would eventually agree to further negotiate the purchase of Uganda (Herzl, Minutes Footnote 4). Shortly before the Congress, he had a fellow Zionist and Englishman, Leopold Greenberg, arrange for the firm of Lloyd George to draw up official documents. Fourteen years later, the Balfour Declaration would coincidentally be written during George’s tern as Prime Minister of England (Pawel 493). 
How this would be perceived by the Greater Actions Committee was a mystery to Herzl, who himself was persuaded there were no other options, if they truly wanted to save their people from further discrimination and obliteration. The only person he confided his proposal in, Max Nordau—German journalist and long-time ally in the movement—reacted so negatively however, that he even predicted the collapse of the movement as a result of this project. Nordau writes in a letter to Herzl dated 
July 17, 1903, “Nine-tenths or ninety-nine hundredths would leave; some would become Hovevei Zion, others Ahad Ha’amites or Weizmannite culture Zionists” (qtd. in Vital Zionism 274). For the first time, Herzl realized that this proposal might call into question not only their immediate settlement of Eretz Israel, but possibly his own position within the movement. He writes the following in a response to Nordau’s letter before the conference hoping to regain his support:
Have you suddenly lost all faith in me [...] It is the task of leadership 
to point the way to the goal, even by a detour, if necessary. Moses 
himself went through the same experience. And if there is a rebellion
in the ranks, we shall just have to deal with it (qtd. in Pawel 495).

As predicted by Nordau, who only four months after the Congress was nearly killed for his support of the Uganda project, there would indeed be a rebellion in the movement following the introduction of this bill. In the next section, I will explain how this strategy divided the Zionists ideologically, provoking one of the more emotional series of debates ever recorded in the history of this social movement. Vital explains the significance of this proposal in the following:
By the time it had died down some two years later, the Zionist 
Movement stood transformed: its leadership changed[...] 
its purposes redefined, and above all else, it’s ethos and quality 
subtly, but crucially altered (268).

These two parties were forced by this single strategy to redefine conceptually how they viewed their own movement’s identity, power structure and strategies for the future. I will argue their social backgrounds, specifically their notion of nationalism, attributed to their conflicting views regarding the territorial site of their future nation.
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Part 2: The Internal Factors causing the Conflict

The entrance card of the Sixth Zionist Congress prophesized in part, the seven turbulent days to follow in Basel reading, ““They who sow in tears, shall reap with songs of joy”.  Tears would in fact be shed by many of the Zionists, after Herzl’s proposition to send a committee to investigate the living conditions of Uganda was ratified with 292 (62.4 %) for the bill, 176 (37.6%) opposed, and 143 abstaining (Vital 300). While it passed exceedingly well (numerically speaking), over 100 delegates would register to speak on this controversial strategy proposed by Herzl. A record attendance of 592 delegates witnessed the seven hour long session where delegates debated the project. After the votes were counted, the mostly Russian delegates led by Yehiel Tschlenow , would dramatically exit the hall and hold a private meeting against the project that would last well into the next day. There they cried, lamented and debated what should be done in several languages, but mostly derided Herzl’s leadership and his lack of connection to Zion (Pawel 508). Pawel describes the condition of the later termed “Zionists of Zion” in the following passage:
The weeping and wailing over vanished principles continued 
   	in the night, rising to a pitch of out and out hysteria, in which 
genuine distress fused with long simmering hostility, rivalries, 
and opportunism (510).
	
This came as a great surprise to Herzl who had originally thought the issue of  relatively little significance in comparison to his diplomatic accomplishments, and introduced the bill to the Actions Committee two days before the congress as a small footnote. The main focal points of his speech were rather to draw greater attention to his success in receiving a charter, the atrocities of the Kishinev Pogrom, and also his obtainment of a letter from the Russian Minister of Interior withdrawing a ban placed on Russian Zionist activity within the Pale. 
Herzl made numerous trips to Russia prior to the congress, in hopes of settling this dispute between Plehve and the Zionists. This crisis began when the Russians delegates mistakenly notified the Czarist government that they would be holding a local Zionist meeting in Minsk in the fall of 1902. While they were given permission from Phelve to hold the meeting, he would later issue a circular banning Zionist activity nearly one year later on July 7, 1903. In this locally organized congress, they discussed principally how to assist Jewish settlement in Palestine, and established a company known as Ge’ulah to help fund the purchasing of land in Israel. They also discussed the current living conditions within Russia, ultimately causing Plehve to outlaw Zionist activity. Herzl was able to secure the ministers’ withdrawal of this law after his trips to Russia, and reported the following to the Actions Committee recorded in the official minutes on August 21, 1903:
Zionism was welcomed by the government as long as its goal was the
establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. But Zionism would not 
be tolerated by the government from the moment it endeavored to 
        organize the Jews in Russia and to involve them in contemporary 
        affairs (Minutes 101).

Herzl was dismayed by the Russian delegates of the Actions Committee who, after introducing this new development, were still suspicious of Phelve’s sincerity and warned him against trusting the Russian government, therefore downplaying the significance of the letter from the Minister of Interior, and subtly his skills in diplomacy. Confusing Herzl furthermore, was the Russians lack of trust for their government, yet their unwillingness to take immediate action to escape, and secure a haven for Russian immigrants, even if it were not in the Land of Israel. Most upsetting for him was their lack of respect for his efforts in at least obtaining a charter. He stressed throughout his address to the Congress, the significance of this charter, even if it was used only as a tool for further negotiation, stating:
I believe the Congress can find a way to make use of this offer. The 
way in which this offer was made to us is bound to help, improve 
and alleviate the situation of the Jewish people without our 
abandoning any of the great principles on which our movement 
was founded (283).

The opponents however, were not responsive to this argument believing Herzl had disregarded the very foundation of the Zionist movement established in Basel, which stated that Palestine would become the territory of the Jewish State. In result, deep despair and stress plagued Herzl during and after the congress. According to Zionist 
Doctor Bernstein Kohan, he treated Herzl twice in Basel for minor heart problems, which caused the executive to have difficulty controlling his breath. Historians have debated whether this is in actuality true. In later years, Kohan would attempt to relate Herzl’s deteriorating health to the Uganda project, claiming that his mental facilities were also diminishing as a result of his condition. Herzl however does mention his heart disease in the following diary passage written on August 22,1903: “The Sixth Congress. The old hurly-burly. My heart is acting up from fatigue. If I were doing this for thanks I would be a big fool,” (Herzl Complete1547).
	Herzl would however maintain composure throughout the congress, even offering to the Zionists of Zion his own resignation if they could no longer put their faith in him as their leader. They would in the end, rejoin the congress, but remained skeptical of Herzl and the survival of the movement in its present form. Sensing this insecurity within the delegates, Herzl would close the congress by dramatically pledging to never disregard Israel and their mission of establishing the Jewish State in Zion. He managed to retain his position as the leader of the Zionist Movement, by relying on his diplomatic abilities once again, and dramatically closed the congress by holding up his right hand and pledging, “If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning!” (qtd. in Vital, Zionism 304).
Historians, depending on their own beliefs regarding the state of Israel, have in the past, tended to explain this crisis as a result of purely external factors such as the Kishinev Pogrom, Herzl’s failing health, or his diplomatic failures prior to the congress. While these are all legitimate reasons for explaining Herzl’s mindset in proposing the East African project, they do not adequately demonstrate why this strategy provoked such turmoil within the movement. Just as a social movement cannot be understood from examining the standpoint and contributions solely of its leaders, to understand a crisis we must examine the internal dynamics of the movement as well as the external factors influencing this event (Staggenborg 128). Sociologist Max Weber explains how historians can better reconstruct the past by not only examining events that cause social change, but also underlying abstractions or relationships that necessitated the events to follow. He writes, “The appearance of the result is, for every casually working empirical science, determined not just from a certain moment, but ‘from eternity’”(Weber 187).
By explaining this project as a result of a particular sequence of events covered in the first section, or rather one of pure chance, historians disregard the fundamental theoretical , tactical differences dividing the movement that existed from the organizations creation in 1897. While Zionism artificially unified these parties, their motives, conceptions of themselves, and plans for the future state of Israel differed dramatically. The Zionist’s of Zion’s reaction to this project resulted therefore not only from their unwillingness to create a state in Africa, but also reflected their conflicting vision of Zionism and the future state of Israel with Herzl’s. This controversy therefore put into question the Zionists’ collective identity and strategy as a social movement. In the following section, I will explain how this quarrel highlighted the ideological split within the movement regarding their collective identity in relation to nationalism, strategy for obtaining Eretz Israel, and the distribution of power within the movement. I will provide examples of other social movements, which have also experienced turmoil due to these same questions of identity, strategy, and power.
Throughout history, social movements of various forms have experienced crisis in forming a collective identity among its activists, due to their general practice of uniting people of various backgrounds, philosophies, and motivations into one social movement. Mary Bernstein discusses in her article, “The Contradictions of Gay Ethnicity: Forging Identity in Vermont”, how the gay and lesbian alliance created in Vermont in the early 1990s, had difficulty agreeing upon how they should portray their cause and identity to the public, similar to many social movements. Bernstein explains how often times it becomes easier for progressive movements, which are generally bringing together a diverse group of people—in this case not only lesbians and gays, but transsexuals, bisexuals and those with genders less easy to traditionally categorize—to simplify their identify and motives of its organization. She explains the pejorative effects this may have on creating a collective conscience in the following statement:
By advocating for rights based on an identity such as ‘woman’ or 
‘gay’, identity movements reinforce the identity on which the 
  	movement is based, and as a result, fail to recognize diversity 
   	homogenize and ignore differences within the identity category, and
inhibit the creation of a ‘politics of commonality’ (Bernstein 85).

	As organizations become more established and gain more prominence, their identity may become stereotypical in a sense, so that it can be easily recognized and understood by society. The gay and lesbian alliance of Vermont was ultimately split between the ethnic-identity strategists who believed in adopting a more simplified definition of themselves in order to gain political rights given to minorities, and the queer strategists, who rejected the fixed notions related to their sexuality because it enabled outsiders too much power in determining how they would define themselves and their cause. Women who were queer theorists for example, would have possibly disliked being portrayed as overly maternal and in this case “just like heterosexual women”, because it attributes values to them that are historically oppressive to their gender, even if helping to ease the alienation they feel from being queer. Lesbians or transsexual women with little connection to children therefore, may have felt that the movement was falsely representing their identities, in hopes of attaining more prestige and political freedom for them in society. 
The Zionist Movement became divided over the Uganda project because it also was not a policy that spoke to all factions within the organization, and therefore was not a political action of commonality. Zionism was originally created, according to the document issued throughout Europe announcing the First Zionist Congress in 1897, to“[give] shape and direction to [the several Zionistic movements]” and invited Jews of all political backgrounds to, “give the Conference a thoroughly representative character.” Over time similar to the Vermont gay and lesbian organization, the Zionist Movement’s ideology became more narrow, and in this case more secular, reflecting the leadership’s perception of the movement, rather than the Greater Actions Committees’ (Haas 152). 
As illustrated in the entrance card of the Second Congress, the movement in the beginning characterized the experiences and wishes of both the religious Jews living in the Diaspora, pictured studying the Talmud, and praying at the “Wailing Wall” in Jerusalem, and the secular farmer refurbishing the land of Zion. Although the title and information of the congress was written in German, traditional Middle-Eastern archways bordered it. Two years later at the Fourth Congress, the souvenir card given to all of the delegates would portray less traditional symbols of the Jewish past by showing Jews suffering in the Diaspora, as an angel with the Star of David on his head directed them to return to the land of Israel. While it does include Jewish symbols, its central theme is the alienation felt in the Diaspora, and their need to thus leave for Zion, rather than to reaffirm their cultural ties to the land emphasized in the previous cards. By the Sixth Congress, the picture was once again very secular, portraying a Jewish farmer tilling the soon to be fertile land of Israel, as a seemingly pagan goddess carrying wheat assured him that agricultural success was soon to follow (Baskin). Although the text was written solely in Hebrew, including the Psalm translated previously, the theme of the card was centered much more on the utopia of Zion, rather than their historical connection to the land.
The Uganda project called into question this convoluted ideological basis of the movement pictured in these cards, and the motivations of its supporters versus its opponents. The differing experiences of living within the Pale and Western European arguably influenced and divided them in how they envisioned the future Jewish State and their collective identity in general. Author David Meyer explains the significance of a state’s influence on its people’s identity writing:
The state is a powerful presence for all social movements, establishing
constituencies or identities[...]delimiting potential alliances both inside
and outside, formal political institutions and, through policy and politics,
creating both grievances and routes for redress (Meyer 25).

As discussed earlier, Western and Eastern Zionists were products of two very different systems and embraced their Judaism and Zionism in result quite differently. While political Zionists of the West such as Herzl, believed in attaining power through the existing power structure and aligning themselves with other nations, cultural Zionists of Russia, who were living under the rule of less humanized government officials, believed in defining their future state and themselves as fundamentally more radical and separate from the nations of the present. Their emphasis on religion, tradition, and the role of the government, was therefore markedly different, and influenced how they perceived the purpose of their organization and each other’s motivations for joining the Zionist Movement. As this division between the Eastern and Western Jews became more public, especially after the announcement of the Uganda Project, Zionists of these separate regions began to once again voice their separate identities as Jews within the movement and the Diaspora. 
Ahad Ha’am became a prominent spokesperson against the Uganda project as a cultural Zionists, regarding the plan as both predictable and exemplary in showing Herzl’s lack of loyalty to the Jewish people’s history and ancient territory. He denounced the Uganda project, and those of Hibbat Zion who had naively believed their ideals would be represented within the movement. He claimed the Uganda project was a clear symbol of how political Zionists were overtly influenced by Western notions of culture and nationalism; wishing to model the Jewish State after a European one, rather than create a uniquely Jewish nation. The purpose of creating this nation was so that their people could be ensured a homeland to thrive in material aspects as well as spiritually redeem themselves. He explains how structurally the attachment of the Western and Eastern Zionists to Judaism and thus Zionism, were differently effected by their experiences in the Diaspora, and thus caused them to have a separate collective identity in the following statement:
The one is a product of anti-Semitism, and is dependent on 
anti-Semitism for its existence; the other is a natural product of a 
real link with a culture of thousands of years, which will retain its 
hold even if the troubles of the Jews all over the world come to an 
end, together with anti-Semitism and all the Jews in every land have
comfortable positions[.] (Ha’am Jewish 5).

Just as queer theorists believed a collective conscience must be based on the internal culture and perception of those activists within the movement, cultural Zionists also believed that Zionism must be influenced by the desires and experiences of the delegates rather than by the political opportunities or lack of, made available to them by outsiders. Easing alienation therefore, should not be the goal of the Zionist Movement, because it was still conceptually reliant on the Christian majority for acceptance and recognition. Cultural Zionism in comparison, sprung from the cultural revolution of the Pale, where they had for centuries suffered due to their rejection of assimilation and the structure of nationalism that put forth the notion that they were a people without a culture or history because they did not possess a territory of their own. They desired to return to Zion, because as a people, they were still strongly committed to their religion and its birthplace. They had always desired to migrate back to this land, and were willing to experience all forms of alienation, even overt violence in the Diaspora, in order to maintain their identity as Jews. Because their connection to one another and to their religion was therefore, not dependent on having a self-ruling state, they believed their culture and history could not be enriched by establishing a new homeland within East Africa. 
 In Ha’am’s essay “Flesh and Spirit”, written in 1904, he explains how similar conflicts occurred in Israel centuries ago between those aristocrats of the Jewish community who were willing to “desert the spiritual heritage of the nation”, and the Pharisees and Prophets in the time of the Second Temple (Ha’am Flesh 153). According to Ha’am, during this period there was a struggle between the practical Jews and the spiritual Prophets. The materialists believed it of greater importance to serve “the flesh” or material needs of the people, while the Prophets were more concerned with protecting the spirit of the Jewish people. In result, there existed a great divide between the two groups in their identification with Judaism and the role of religion in their nation. In this essay, Ha’am argues the power elites’ of this ancient time shared ideological similarities with the political Zionists of modern day and writes the following:
The whole aim of the [political materialists] was to make the body
politic dominant above all other interests, to win for the Jewish State 
a position of honor among its neighbors and to secure it against 
external aggression (152).

Just as the aristocrats of the ancient time lost respect within Israel, the political Zionists shared the same fate in Ha’am’s opinion, and would eventually lose power within the Zionist Movement because they did not share the same collective identity as the greater Jewish majority. Their failure in negotiating the purchase of Israel, would continue to damage their credibility within the Jewish community. Their main objective in Ha’am’s opinion, of convincing the Christian population of their modernity and civility, would be unproductive as well due to the persistence of anti-Semitism, ultimately causing the community to lose hope in “practical” or political work. After Herzl and the political Zionists had lost strength, Ha’am prophesized the movement would once again take on the character of the Hovevei Zion, seeing the Jewish people as an ethnicity, rather than a wandering people desperate to find acceptance and a home within the Diaspora. He explains how the movement’s identity must become once again more spiritually centered in the following:
	If, as we hope, the future holds for Israel yet a third national existence,
	we may believe that the fundamental principle of individual as of
	national life will be neither the sovereignty of the flesh over the spirit,
	nor the annihilation of the flesh for the spirit’s sake, but the uplifting
	of the flesh by the spirit (Ha’am 158).

Only after rejuvenating the people’s connection with the past, could the people of the Diaspora truly evolve both physically and mentally. 
The ideological differences separating the cultural Zionists and the political Zionists ultimately presupposed the controversy of the Uganda project. Herzl had neglected the powerful Eastern Russian landsmannschaft or local committee’s vision of the movement and social change for too long. By negotiating the Uganda project without considering how it may have been interpreted by those more committed to cultural Zionism, Herzl displayed his inability to manage the political divisions within the movement (Meyer 19).
Strategy however, is just as pivotal to a social movement’s survival and stability as creating a collective identity all of its members can support. Authors Colin Barker and Michael Lavalette of the article “Strategizing and the Sense of Context: Reflections on the First Two Weeks of the Liverpool Docks Lockout, September-October 1995,” explain how often times movements struggle to determine the best method for attaining their demands (140). Inevitably, movements must decide whether inaction is better than negotiating on terms that are less favorable. Barker and Lavalette analyze the strategies employed by dock workers in Liverpool, who after several incidences of unfair labor management practices, went on strike against the Mercy Docks and Harbor Company beginning in 1995, for over two years. The union strikers were diverse in age, and comprised of a younger less-experienced segment that were extremely more militant in their beliefs regarding how to conduct the strike than the leaders, who had valuable knowledge in negotiating due to their presence in the unions of the 1980s which had orchestrated large strikes throughout England. After two years had passed, little had been accomplished for those walking on the picket line, without jobs, and relying on their family and spouses for support while they attempted to negotiate the renewal of their jobs with the dock company. 
The authors characterize the movements’ leaders as possessing a fatalist approach because they understood there was little possibility in their demands being served under the present conditions, and therefore chose to take great efforts in damaging the reputation of their former employees, rather than reaching an agreement with the company. In the end, the strikers would go down as heroic figures in English society, fighting a cause that was destined to fail. Whether in retrospect inaction was the best strategy however is debatable. Barker and Lavalette write:
A practical challenge to that case—involving arguments for more
boldness, for more open challenges[...]and for a greater sense of
urgency—would have implied a challenge to the senior stewards
leadership and to the dockers’ existing identities” (155).
Throughout this twenty eight month period, the older strikers repeatedly refused enormous settlements, and instead chose to stand by their principles and one another, waiting for the company to reform its negligent policies. In the end, they made a decision to reject negotiating on terms they felt conflicted with their principles, ultimately benefiting no one in the end. According to the authors, this question of whether to negotiate is crucial to social movements, who are rarely offered the best terms in the beginning. Leaders are often times forced to reevaluate their own expectations and purpose as a movement, if they do want to achieve some kind of progress. Author 
Ruud Koopmans writes:
To profit from the opportunities offered by institutional channels,
contenders have to be willing to accept incremental gains, and to
define their goals in a narrow way. In exclusive or closed regimes,
the chances of success of such a strategy if it is possible at all, are 
not very great (Koopmans 26).

Even if leaders are willing to accept negotiations, their ability to convince those they represent to take this course of action, is often just as questionable. Leaders take on great responsibility in directing social movements, because they are not only required to find creative solutions in guiding the organization, but must be willing to take strategical risks that can possibly damage their chances for success as well as their own positions within the movement. Barker and Lavaellete writes:
To strategize is to mobilize the will, to energize and commit the 
self, simultaneously placing body, social career and standing, 
credibility and identity at risk (142).

Against the warning of his closest allies, Herzl would propose the Uganda project, and in result take a chance in undermining his own authority in the movement. Opponents of the Uganda project were in result, able to call into question Herzl’s understanding of their collective identity, and most importantly his ability to lead and strategize the route to Eretz Israel. Similar to the older dock workers of the Liverpool strike, the cultural Zionists supported inaction over negotiation, and were directly challenging Herzl’s methodology symbolized in the Uganda project, which they believed compromised their movements’ core values. Not all cultural or extremely religious Zionists however, were opposed to the Uganda project or felt that this act was conflicting with the foundation of the movement. In fact, orthodox Eastern Russian Zionists of the Mizrahi argued that the connection Jews had with the Land of Israel would not falter due to political events or their station in the world, and in result, overwhelmingly supported the Uganda project (Shmuel 302). Herzl had from the beginning, argued that if approved by the congress, settlement in East Africa would be only a temporary refuge, serving multiple functions until they could finally migrate to Zion.
Uganda for one, would serve as a interim territory for those fleeing the Czarist regime of Russia. Throughout his speech Herzl stressed the seriousness of the Kishinev Pogrom and the inevitable violence to follow if they did not find a haven for their people immediately. He writes the following in his diaries on May 30, 1903:
Kishinev is not over. The effects are yet to come. According to my 
info, a terrible fear has taken hold of the Jews in Russia. The 
immediate consequences will be a new immigration movement 
(Herzl, Complete1501).

 Herzl’s prediction was in retrospect quite foretelling of the immigration crisis to follow. The number of immigrants pouring into Western Europe and the United States had increased quite rapidly within the last four years of Herzl’s life. In 1901, approximately 58,000 immigrants would immigrate to the United States from Russia, comprising over seventy percent of the immigrants admitted into the country (Vital 312). This number would nearly double by 1904, where an estimated 106,000 Russian Jews would enter Ellis Island that year.  A minority of Russian and cultural Zionists split from their former allies to support this action, believing that the survival of their people was more pressing than the protection of their identity or egos. The politics surrounding the immigration laws of the United States and England, where most of the Russian population had been absorbed, were causing many Jews of these nations to question how much longer their governments would be willing to accept these desperate people. Finding a territory such as Uganda, where even one million people could settle, was to them a desperate, but worthy option to further consider. 
Herzl viewed Uganda as a territory, which could also be used for further negotiations with the Sultan, rather than a final destination (Shmuel 301). Herzl’s strategy throughout his years as the Executive of the Actions Committee, had been to attempt to gain as many allies and the opportunities they could provide to the movement as was conceivable. Vital characterizes Herzl’s tactics in the following:
Try everything within reason, advances on as broad a front as possible, 
seek to turn every gain, no matter how minute [...]to an advantage, 
and keep your eyes throughout on that central purpose, which the 
Foreign Office had just defined as ‘the amelioration of the position
of the Jewish Race’  (285).
  
While cultural Zionists viewed these negotiations as compromising their ethos as a movement, others felt that Herzl’s actions had helped inform the world that they would no longer wait for their situation to improve, but would actively seek out their own solution. Max Nordau emphasized in his address to the congress on August 24, 1903 Herzl’s achievements over the last six years in securing support from the most powerful countries in the world such as Russia, Germany, the United States as well as England for the Zionists’ cause. While the Uganda project was in no way a final solution to the Jewish Question, it was a byproduct of the movement’s success in bringing the world’s attention to the condition of their people. He explains how the movement transformed the rest of the worlds’ perception of the Jewish population in the following:
[Before] the rise of Zionism, we absolutely did not ask. Among our-
selves we heaved deep sighs, expressed longing desires in prose and
verse, pressed each other’s hands with significant looks, but we have 
never stood before the powers and in an unequivocal form and openly 
        and distinctly stated what we wanted (Nordau Address).

Cultural Zionists however did not view the Uganda project as a sign of progress, but instead, a symbol of the political Zionists willingness to become a puppet state of the great powers of the world, rather than a self-ruled Jewish nation. For years these two groups envisioned different methods for attaining Eretz Israel. It was only after the introduction of the Uganda project however, that this ever growing minority was willing to express their own beliefs regarding Herzl’s inept leadership and the methodology needed to secure their ancient homeland. 
The Odessa Committee or the Russian Zionists believed that rapid immigration to Eretz Israel was unfeasible due to both the present political constraints, and the large number of Jews living in the world at that time. As past members of Hibbat Zion, they had for years dedicated great amounts of money and time into funding yishuvs or settlements within the Land of Israel. As the rift between themselves and the political Zionists grew, they once again began to take an active interest in funding these settlements. With Herzl’s approval, they would create the Ge’ulah at the Minsk Conference, and there argued for gradual immigration into the Land of Israel, directly conflicting with Herzl’s plan of rapid immigration (Heymann 26).  Herzl’s only concern regarding this project, according to a letter he wrote to the Ge’ulah in June of 1903, was that “all clean elements” such as contact with corrupt realtors be “kept out of this from the beginning”, so it would not tarnish the reputation of the Zionists (Herzl Minutes 71).  Russian Zionists such as Yeheil Tschlenow and Menahem Ussishkin in charge of creating this company to fund future settlements, believed that only after they had secured a foothold in the land, would the Sultan consider recognizing their people as having a legitimate claim to the territory. The Jewish people would also need convincing in their mind, to move to this “barren land”, and would never fully uproot themselves until they had been spiritually revived according to Ahad Ha’am. In Minsk, Ha’am would have the honor of addressing the congress. He argued for gradual immigration, touching on points made in his article “The Wrong Way” written in 1889 in which he stated the following:
Instead of adding yet more ruins, let us endeavor to give the idea
itself strong roots and to strengthen and deepen its hold on the
Jewish people, not by force, but by the spirit. Then we shall in
time have the possibility of doing actual work (Wrong 4).

Ultimately, these two factions within the movement believed in two separate methods for attaining Eretz Israel. After Herzl’s introduction of the Uganda project, the Russian Zionists saw an opportunity to openly criticize Herzl’s tactics when he was at his most vulnerable position, having lost hope in mediating the purchase of Zion from the Sultan. This conflict however was not just a product of Herzl’s methods or conception of Zionism, but also stemmed from his style of leadership and his unwillingness to distribute greater power and responsibility to the delegates. The Uganda project was as much a result of ideological differences, as it was of a few restless Zionists wishing to exert more control over Herzl and the movement.
	Almost all great social movements have suffered at one point or another from power struggles. While ideological differences are quite common amongst movements, factionalism within a party may develop after members begin to routinely question the tactics, commitment and direction of the movement, and can in some instances eventually lead to the dismemberment of the organization. Author Mildred Schwartz explains how factions pose serious threats to the power structure of a movement writing:
	By deliberately challenging the status quo, factions generate conflicts 
that will almost inevitably alter a movement. Intentionally or not, they
        may even invite the destruction of their host (Schwartz 158).
	
In Schwartz’s article, “Factions and the Continuity of Political Challengers”, she relates how the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and the New Democratic Party (NDP) of Canada formed, and were later challenged by the Waffle party. While the Waffle party would never gain much popularity throughout the labor and agricultural communities of Canada, it did manage to remove from power the NDP leadership in the district of Saskatchewan in the late 1960s. It won a seat in the provincial election by arguing that the NDP had been negligent in maintaining Canadian unions independence from U.S. influence. Eventually the Waffle would become an organization that was committed to educating the public on the effectiveness of these political parties, rather than vying for a position in the political arena. They would like many factions of social movements however, pose a valuable question according to Schwartz, by asking, “Whose interpretation of ideology is correct?” (161).
Prior to the announcement of the Uganda project, the ever growing number of Russian Zionists, totaling over half of the delegates at the Sixth Congress, desired to pose this same question, and exert their perception of themselves and their strategy, as the dominant majority of the Zionist Movement. They believed in restructuring the Zionist movement, namely with Herzl’s removal as the Executive of the Actions Committee, in order to begin cultural work in the Land of Israel. While they would not openly argue for his resignation up until this volatile congress, they had for many years been unsatisfied with his leadership. 
His secretiveness for example, was in their opinion, a sign of his autocratic leadership, and desire to rule the movement as a dictator, without any consideration of the delegates wishes or concerns as a whole. While the delegates had on numerous occasions attempted to have Herzl inform them of his actions, by requesting reports be written monthly by the Executive to be delivered to the local committees, he had for the most part disregarded these demands. Herzl viewed these reports as a form of supervision, which he openly refuted as time consuming and threatening his ability to negotiate (Heymann 17). His skill in speaking and general talent in schmoozing, often pacified most of the delegates, who although in the dark, found him accountable following his addresses at the annual congresses. 
Eastern Russians however were not so easily convinced of Herzl’s competency due to his reluctance to notify even the ruling body of the movement, the Actions Committee, of his progress or failure in his latest negotiations. The Actions Committee for example, heard about the prospects of settling the Jewish State in El-Arish from a newspaper article, before being officially were notified of this plan by Herzl himself (Heymann 19). Prior to the congress, a distraught Tschelnow would write the following in a letter to an unknown source, illustrating Herzl’s secretive dealings as the leader of the movement:
   	Herzl is supposed to be in Cairo. We the members of the A.C. know 
  	nothing. Absolutely nothing. This has never happened in our move-
ment, and this cannot be kept up any longer (Minutes 61).

When Herzl exposed the negotiations regarding East African settlement therefore to the A.C., which he had already set into motion with the English government, the Russian Zionists’ response was quite predictable in light of these internal factors. 
As retribution for the El-Arish affair, they had been orchestrating their own private meetings. Russian Zionist, Menahem Ussishkin would miss the Sixth Zionist Congress, as he traveled throughout Israel visiting the many settlements he and the past Hibbat Zionists had helped support over the years. Much to Herzl’s annoyance, Ussishkin would also hold the first “Palestinian Congress” without his knowledge, in which leaders of the settlements met to discuss their political situation. Herzl was extremely offended by this action, believing it was not only a threat to their chances of eventually creating a state by drawing unwanted Turkish attention to the settlements, but also undermined his position of authority within the movement. He states the following to Ussishkin in an Actions Committee meeting in April of 1904:
You go to Eretz Israel, ruled by a Pasha, and you do a thing the like of
which, has never been seen in Turkey, a political meeting [...] the 
Zionist Congress is there where the organized will of the people
resides, and that is our Congress. And you convene congresses in
Minsk and Zikhron Ya’akov (qtd. in Vital, Zionism 343).

Herzl however was also to blame for his handling of the Uganda project in his initial method of introducing it to the A.C. According to Tschlenow, Herzl denied the members of the A.C. their constitutional right to vote on the Uganda project prior to its introduction to the Greater Actions Committee (Tschlenow 103). Although Herzl had agreed to allow a vote on the project to be taken before he addressed the general congress, Herzl slipped out of the room just prior to reading the section of his speech which dealt with this controversial project. In his diaries, Herzl regrettably recalls at some point during these initial meetings also telling what he called the “popularity hounds Tschlenow, Bernstein Kohan and company” that if they did not vote in approval of the Uganda project that they “could no longer stay on the A.C. any longer” (Complete 1549). This would in result, cause the Russian Zionists to leave the hall, and ultimately question whether they should secede from the Zionist Movement. 
Attempting to capitalize on Herzl’s weakness, various figures of both the west and east would strive in the year following the congress to supercede him as the Executive of the Actions Committee. Ussishkin, Tschlenow, and of the west 
Chaim Weizmann would go on record, in public newspapers and amongst their own local committees, deriding Herzl’s leadership and push for his resignation if he continued to support the Uganda project.  Weizmann was of the many less radical Zionists, who at first was mildly in support of the project. Only after the debate became more serious and personal attacks were made on Herzl’s character by the Zionists of Zion, did he change positions in the argument, possibly sensing a political opportunity for himself. To the group of dissenters who had left the congress after the project was passed, Weizmann would state the following about Herzl’s ability to lead the movement:
He only takes external conditions into account, whereas the power 
on which we rely is the psychology of the people and its living 
desires[...]It’s the people’s consciousness that has [now] to be 
bolstered[...] Cultural work must be put before all else 
	(qtd.inVital, Zionism 305).

Herzl would acknowledge Weizmann and specifically Bernstein Kohan following the congress as Zionists who were “persuaded by the colors and local committees”, and neglected to stand by their first assessment of the project and the leader, leaving him “in the lurch” in hopes of their own selfish political aspirations (Minutes Footnote 4). Herzl describes his despair following the congress writing:
	You must never forget how terribly difficult my position is. I won’t 
	yield to the threats of the Kharkov people, but even those loyal to the
	Congress may seriously reproach me [...] I literally don’t know where
	we now stand, and yet I am pressed from all sides to make decisions 
(Herzl Complete 1587).
	
Throughout the last year of Herzl’s life, he would continue to struggle to convince the Zionists of Zion of his commitment to the Land of Israel, and the seriousness of the immigration catastrophe soon to follow. Amongst his colleagues soon after the congress he would consider resigning as the leader of the movement and began to seriously question his attachment to Eretz Israel. He admits the following in his diaries:
Although I was originally only a Jewish statesman[...]no matter where, 
later I did lift up the flag of Zion and became myself a Lover of Zion
(1548).

While Herzl began to question his project in his last remaining days, his emphasis on the future devastation to follow of the Russian people in his address would resonate with the delegates when just two weeks after the congress, the Gomel Pogrom would occur in Western Russia. Unlike any other pogrom prior, it would make history, marking the first time Jews physically defended themselves from their deranged attackers. Eastern Zionists became aware of the political work desired by their community  as well as were further alienated from the Russian government, and in result slowly began to rebuild their relationship with the Zionist Movement’s leader following the A.C.’s meeting in April of 1904.  Herzl would sadly die of heart disease only two months after their meeting in which they declared a truce. Herzl’s diplomatic efforts however would live on well after his death and inspire others to continue working for the creation of a Jewish State within the Land of Israel as well as outside of it. While Herzl’s reputation is encased with controversy still to this day, his legacy to the Israeli people is still upheld as the founder of the Zionist Movement and Israel. 
The Uganda project would eventually be defeated in the Seventh Zionist Congress in 1905. While a commission did travel to East Africa to survey the country against the wishes of the Zionists of Zion, they reported the land unsuitable due to a number of factors, but most importantly English settlers resistance to a Jewish colony being created in their vicinity. A vote was then taken to confirm that the movement no longer consider establishing a Jewish State outside of Palestine ever again, which passed easily.  
This development would in result cause Israel Zangwill, a close associate of Herzl’s and socialist, to lead forty other Zionists in breaking away from the Zionist Movement to form the Jewish Territorial Organization immediately after the Congress. Zangwill adamantly supported the idea of building an immediate refuge outside of Palestine, believing only a secular state established outside of Palestine could ensure a democratic, just, and political haven to all of its citizens. The Territorialists only minor success would in the end be the Galveston Plan, in which they helped 10,000 Jews immigrate to the United States between 1907 and 1914. Their movement would lose strength when the Balfour Declaration was granted in 1917 , giving Jews hope that they would shortly have the right of return to the Land of Israel.
Conclusion
The questions the Uganda project raised within the Zionist movement I believe however are still relevant to the political situation in Israel today. I first became inspired to study Zionism, after I visited Israel for the first time in the summer of 2003. I initially thought I would write my thesis on my experience and perception of the Birthright trip offered to all college-aged Jewish students in the United States. After reading Walter Lacquer’s book suggested to me by Professor David Frank however, I realized how timely and influential this great quarrel of the Sixth Zionist congress had been in shaping U.S. and Israeli relations, as well as the culture and politics of the modern Jewish State. As I traveled throughout the country, I could not help but wonder what would Herzl think of the state of Israel if he were alive today?
For the first time in 1,871 years, Israel now holds the single largest Jewish population in the world with 5.6 million people (Krauthammer). Although they are numerically growing each year, their survival as a nation is ironically still as questionable as it ever was. Since its establishment in 1948, they have fought in three major wars with their Arab neighbors, and continue to exist in a bitter struggle with those they displaced, the Palestinians, now occupying the West Bank, and of recent the Gaza Strip. Did Herzl foresee the future conflicts between the Jews of Israel and the Arab population? The truth of the matter is no not really; Herzl never once formally mentioned the land being occupied, or felt that this population would pose any sort of threat to their return to Zion. Characterizing this sentiment was the Zionist slogan used throughout his term as the leader of the Zionist Movement, “A Land without a people for a people without a land”.  
How would then Herzl react to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has been the cause of thousands of Israeli and Palestinian deaths since 1948? Was this the political haven he envisioned in his manifesto The Jewish State?
Sadly, I do not believe so. Israel without question resembles more closely 
Ahad Ha’am’s vision of the Jewish State, being the Jewish cultural center of the world, rather than a political refuge. While Jews today have the ability to immigrate to Israel due to the right of return, and can easily attain citizenship, Israel’s volatile relationship with the Arab population has prevented most from taking up this opportunity to become citizens, believing it safer to live within the Diaspora. The reality of the situation is that most would rather risk assimilation, and even anti-Semitism, than their lives. So each year they support their synagogues, build and enrich their Jewish communities, possibly visit Israel at most once or twice a year, and defend Israel when it comes under attack by those concerned for the human rights of those they drove out of the country. They in a sense, still struggle to understand as Herzl and the early Zionist did, how best to ensure the survival of their population. Is cultural or political work going to solve the Jewish Question?
 In the last year, numerous threats have been made by the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad , calling for the destruction of the state of Israel. According to some, the Jewish population is as vulnerable to obliteration due to a nuclear bomb, as it was when Hitler first began using anti-Semitic propaganda to rouse support for his Final Solution. In order to prevent such an atrocity from happening ever again, Israel has relied on the protection of the United States, as well as become a highly militarized society.  Herzl desired the Jewish State to be close allies with those of the west, forming an “outpost of civilization”, but in no way did he envision the state depending so greatly on the financial aid and military protection of the Unites States. One must wonder even how Aham Ha’am would view these developments? What benefits to the culture and spirit of the people can be achieved when its population lives in a constant state of war?
	As I toured Israel, I was overwhelmed with emotion by how small, only measuring eight miles across, and yet powerful this territory had been in influencing modern day politics. While I was touring Israel, I happened to witness a turbulent period in Israeli history, as people crowded the sides of major highways and streets in protest of the Disengagement from the Gaza Strip soon to occur late that summer. Jewish settlements were being once again evacuated, as Israel planned to allow Palestinians the right to self-govern this small piece of land. All Israelis during this period were reminded of the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin no doubt in November of 1995, when he attempted this same feat by beginning to negotiate the evacuation of the West Bank and the Gaza, only to be shot and killed by a right-wing radical. Although ten years later the removal of the settlers would transpire this time peacefully, and without major conflict, the division this act had created between the population was still quite visible as cars were decorated with blue or orange flags showing their support or opposition to the disengagement. 
Just like all countries, Israel is divided ideologically. The difference however, is that as much as Israel attempts to be a secular, democratic state, it cannot escape the clutches of its fundamentalist roots. Fanaticism of its own people can just as easily threaten the sanctity and unity of its people, as a suicide bomber, shown by Rabin’s assassination. Author Derek Penslar explains, “Relations between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs are intolerable, and those between secular and Orthodox Jews within Israel are little better” (Penslar).
One of the more powerful memories I have of Israel, confirming this statement was when I was walking through an Orthodox neighborhood in Jerusalem with a group of Jewish students from the university. As we quietly walked through this street, for once I think we all felt like we were truly in Israel, witnessing something larger than ourselves, our ancestor’s culture, our roots. There on the cobblestone street of old Jerusalem we listened to our tour guide describe the cultural differences between this highly devout community and the greater population of Israel, as we observed children adorned in kipots or yamakas innocently play games on the street with one another, and peer out of their windows at us. 
This romantic vision was suddenly shattered however, when one of the children, possibly upset by our presence as tourists, yelled defiantly out of the window at one of the girls in our group inappropriately dressed, and called her a “shiksa”, a derogatory term for a non-Jewish woman. While the girl was being disrespectful by baring too much of her body to be in such a neighborhood, I was shocked to hear afterwards many of the Israelis confirm that this kind of event occurred quite often, even to Israelis.  Secular Jews were often times criticized by those of the Orthodox and Hasidic community for neglecting their spiritual responsibilities. How was it possible that although both shared in their struggle to overcome the political crisis enveloping their society, they were still alienated from one another, once again due to their different interpretations of their religion?
Social location, religiosity, nationalism, and shared experiences of oppression played vital roles not only in causing the formation of the Zionist Movement, but deeply influenced the formation and culture of the state of Israel. The conflict over the significance of cultural work versus political work in revitalizing the Jewish race is one that has long existed in the Diaspora since the late 19th century and I believe is still as important today. While the Uganda project has since Herzl’s passing, been overlooked by Israelis and historians as a miscalculation or sign of his failing health, I hope I have shown that it stems from this ancient ideological divide, and will continue to plague the Jewish State. Herzl’s decision to propose this project was motivated by his experiences in the Diaspora, his sounds assessments of anti-Semitism and the political environment in the world at that time, and in retrospect, may not have been such a bad idea after all.
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